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The discovery of the first case of mad cow disease in the United States in 2003 
reverberated across the beef and cattle industry. This study employs a general 
equilibrium model to analyze the potential economic effects of mad cow disease on 
the  beef, cattle, and other meat industries under three scenarios, ranging from most 
favorable to most pessimistic. The scenario with 90% foreign demand decline and 10% 
domestic demand reduction generates results consistent with the actual outcomes aRer 
the mad cow disease outbreak. Only if domestic demand declines significantly will the 
economic hardship in the U.S. beef and cattle industry be very large. 
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Introduction 
The U.S. government announced on December 23,2003, that a Holstein dairy cow on a 
farm in Mabton, Washington State,  was infected with mad cow disease (bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy, or BSE). Humans can contract a fatal form of  this disease, known as 
variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD),  by eating contaminated beef products such 
as spinal cord and nerve tissues of  infected animals. The discovery of  this first case of 
mad cow disease outbreak in the United States reverberated across the beef and cattle 
industry, causing serious alarm among ranchers, processors, and consumers. Ranchers 
were worried about the economic ruin mad cow  disease could bring, processors were 
apprehensive of  falling beef prices, and consumers were concerned about health and 
safety issues arising from beef  consumption. As  a food  safety precaution, federal 
authorities recalled about 10,000 pounds of meat from the infected cow and other cows 
slaughtered on the same day in a Washington State plant (Dreyfuss, 2003). 
The mad cow disease epidemic in England in the 1980s and 1990s crippled the beef 
industry in that country. When the BSE crisis in England peaked in 1992, more than 
7,200 cows were infected in that year alone. From 1995 to 2003, 143 people died from 
vCJD (Sherman,  2004). This disease also occurred in other European countries and had 
adverse effects on cattle and  beef industries (Herrmann,  Thompson, and Krischik-Bautz, 
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2002). The discovery of a single cow infected with this disease in Alberta, Canada, in 
May of 2003 caused a heavy loss to the Canadian beef industry as agencies tested and 
destroyed hundreds of cows. Even though it was an  isolated incident, the ensuing public 
fear resulted in a marked decline in Canadian beef consumption and exports to other 
countries, which caused beef prices to plummet. Live cattle prices fell from a peak of 
$1.10 to $0.35 per pound. 
The U.S. government took extraordinary measures to protect the health of the public 
while safeguarding the economic interests of the beef and cattle industry. Because of 
consumers' concerns about beef safety and the adverse economic impact on the U.S. 
cattle industry, then  Agriculture Secretary  Ann Veneman and  the  National Cattlemen's 
Association repeatedly assured the American public that this case of mad cow disease 
was a single, isolated incident and not widespread, and it  was safe to consume beef. The 
public was also informed that the infected parts of the cow (nerve tissue, spinal cord, 
and small intestine)  had been removed from the food chain (also see Coffey et al., 2005). 
This outbreak was expected to drastically affect domestic beef consumption and U.S. 
beef exports, particularly if the disease were to become widespread. Approximately 26 
million cattle are slaughtered annually in the United States, and 90% of the beef is 
consumed domestically. The United States exports 10% of its  beef production. These 
exports are valued at  about $3 billion. Fifty-three countries, including four leading 
importers (Japan, South Korea, Mexico, and Canada), banned imports of U.S. beef. 
Other notable countries participating in this ban include Australia, Brazil, China, 
Colombia, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Russia, Singapore, South 
Africa, Taiwan, and Thailand (Coffey et al., 2005). Consequently, U.S. beef exports 
fell from 2.5 billion pounds in 2003, to 500 million pounds in 2004 (USDA/Economic 
Research Service, 2005). 
Following the discovery of the first case of mad cow disease in the United States, 
cattle and beef prices declined sharply. The cattle futures price dropped by about 19%, 
and beef cash prices fell by  15$ a pound in a matter of days (Henderson, 2003). Live 
cattle prices declined sharply from 91$ per pound on December 22, 2003, to 78$ on 
December 26. The beef industry estimated that  because of export and domestic demand 
declines, the ensuing  price decline would result in about $6 billion in losses to the cattle, 
beef, and allied industries (Gersema, 2003). Henderson projected that the economic cost 
to the cattle industry would be about $2 billion and the cost to the beef industry could 
reach up to $2 billion. 
Since the December 2003 discovery of the first case, a U.S.-born cow with BSE was 
identified in Texas in June 2005, and another case of  mad cow disease was found in 
Alabama in March 2006. BSE occurrence remains a serious concern to the cattle and 
beef industry as a dozen importers, including Japan and Taiwan, have not reopened 
their borders to U.S. beef. Clemens (2005) argues that domestic and foreign reactions 
to BSE cases in North America have permanently changed overseas markets for U.S. 
beef. In  particular, increased surveillance for BSE enhances the discovery of additional 
indigenous cases. In  the  event of a widespread occurrence,  there would be a large decline 
in domestic and foreign demand (Coffey et al., 2005).' We believe an examination of the 
'Fox and Blake (2004)  surveyed consumers to ascertain the potential reduction in beef consumption in response to different 
intensities of BSE occurrences. In a single case of mad cow disease occurrence, 32%  of the consumers indicated they would 
consume less beef, and 12%  would stop beef consumption; if 20 cases of BSE were discovered, 43%  of those surveyed stated 
their beef consumption would decline, and 26%  reported they would not consume any beef. Additionally, Fox and Blake found Devadoss et al.  Mad Cow Disease  443 
impacts of  such demand shocks on the U.S. beef and cattle industry is a timely and 
worthwhile research focus. 
Accordingly, the purpose of this study is to analyze, using a general equilibrium 
model, the economic effects of possible demand declines from mad cow disease outbreaks 
on the beef and cattle industry under alternative assumptions regarding the severity 
of  outbreaks. In particular, we utilize a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model 
to conduct scenario analyses of foreign and domestic shocks induced by mad cow disease, 
from an ex ante perspective. That is, while the observed magnitudes of  demand shocks 
are used as guidelines in developing the exogenous changes, the analyses are not 
intended to replicate the actual events. 
The organization of this article proceeds as follows. First, the structure of the general 
equilibrium model is presented. The data used for the analyses are then described, 
followed by a discussion of  the procedures and assumptions employed in the analysis. 
The next section presents the results of the analysis, and the final section provides a 
summary and conclusions. 
The General Equilibrium Model 
The mad cow  scare not only hurt the beef and cattle industry, but also other related 
industries in the upstream, downstream, and horizontal sectors (McDonald and Roberts, 
1998).  The industries affected on the supply side of the market include ranches, feedlots, 
slaughter houses, processing plants, feed stores, trucking, and shipping. Those affected 
on the demand side are wholesale and retail stores, restaurants, other meat products 
(poultry, pork, and fish), food items (french fries), trucking, and shipping. Because of 
these economic interdependencies, any shock in the beef  and cattle industries will 
percolate to allied industries. 
The magnitude of economic loss if households were to lose confidence in the safety of 
beef not only would have implications for the beef and cattle industries, but would have 
important implications  for other parts of the economy as well. For example, widespread 
occurrences of  BSE can lead to underutilization of  slaughtering and processing plants, 
adverse impact on cattle feed markets (hay and feed grains),  job losses, and lower wages 
to labor and rental rates to capital. A reduction in consumer demand for beef could 
increase the demand for substitute meats such as pork, chicken, and fish. Similarly, loss 
of consumer confidence is likely to reduce the demand for beef products marketed in the 
fast food industry and can result in significant job and income loss in this industry. 
Estimates of these impacts will be useful to policy makers in assessing the magnitude 
of economic damages and implementing policies to prevent future occurrences of BSE. 
Only a general equilibrium analysis will provide estimates of  the impacts of  the BSE 
outbreak on all the related industries. 
When an unexpected event or catastrophe occurs, there is often a panic among the 
public, leading to an overreaction. Also, there is a tendency among the public to believe 
that such an event is going to have widespread consequences across many sectors of the 
economy. Such was the case in the discovery of  mad cow disease in the United States. 
that if both questions (a single case and 20 cases of BSE discovery) were posed together, 39%  would reduce their beef 
consumption,  and 46%  would no longer consume any beef. In summary, multiple BSE cases will have a significant negative 
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The initial reaction was that the public lost confidence not only in beef safety but also 
in other meat and restaurant food safety. Such a loss of confidence can take a toll on the 
economy. The effects of mad cow disease on other sectors of the economy can be studied 
only through general equilibrium analysis, which incorporates interlinkages among 
various sectors and captures all direct and indirect effects. Hence, we develop a comput- 
able general equilibrium (CGE)  model of the  U.S. economy to examine the impact of mad 
cow disease on meat and cattle sectors and the rest of the economy. In an earlier study, 
McDonald and Roberts (1998) employed a CGE model to investigate the economy-wide 
impacts of BSE in the United Kingdom. 
The structure of the U.S. CGE model is similar to the standard CGE model constructed 
by Lofgren (2000) and Gilbert (2002,2003). For an elaborate documentation including 
the mathematical equations, variable definitions, and parameter specifications, see 
Holland, Stodick, and Devadoss (2004).  The CGE model mathematically represents the 
inner  workings of the  economy with Walrasian market clearing in all sectors. Represent- 
ative agents  (producers,  consumers, institutions, etc.)  in the various sectors apply micro- 
economic  behavior, i.e., maximize their objective functions subject to certain constraints. 
For instance, households maximize utility subject to budget constraints, and producers 
maximize profits given the resource endowments. All markets are interconnected and 
consistent. For example, commodity demand functions adhere to the first-order con- 
ditions derived from the utility maximization of the specified utility function, and 
similarly, factor demand functions come from the first-order conditions of the profit 
maximization and the specified production function. 
Various equations included in the model are discussed next. The model contains four 
blocks: (a)  production and commodity, (b)  price, (c) institutional, and (dl system con- 
straints. The production and commodity block specifies a LeontieWconstant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) production function, factor demand, intermediate input demand, 
output conversion, the rest of  the world (ROW) demand for U.S. goods, U.S. import 
demand, Armington composite supply, import-domestic demand ratio, Armington com- 
posite transformation, and export-domestic use ratio. 
The Leontief-cum-CES  production function employed in the model uses intermediate 
inputs, capital, and labor. Intermediate inputs enter  the  production function as  Leontief 
fixed coefficients. Capital and labor comprise the CES part of the production function. 
The elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is assumed to be 0.99. Thus, the 
CES part of  the production  function  closely mimics the Cobb-Douglas production 
function. The first-order conditions of the Leontief-cum-CES  production function yield 
specifications for factor demand. The intermediate input demand is specified as a fixed 
proportion of output, a result of the Leontief part of the production function. Capital is 
sector specific and labor is mobile across the sectors. Thus, the length of  run for the 
analysis employed in this CGE model is short run. Total factor supply for the U.S. econ- 
omy is considered fured. Rest-of-the-world import demand for U.S. goods is a function 
of world price. 
International trade allows for imperfect substitution between domestic goods and 
foreign goods, and the  general equilibrium models easily incorporate such product differ- 
entiation. An Armington/CES function is used to capture the imperfect substitution 
between domestic goods and imported goods. For example, domestic beef and imported 
beef generally differ in quality, i.e., they are  not necessarily perfect substitutes,  but both 
are combined (albeit with imperfect substitution)  to form a final product mixture. Thus, Devadoss et al.  Mad Cow Disease  445 
the  Armington aggregate comprises the mixture of domestic and imported goods to form 
the composite commodities. The elasticity of  substitution between domestic and 
imported goods is assumed to be 2.0 for manufacturing sectors, 1.5  for cattle, and 0.5 for 
wholesale beef.2  The first-order conditions from the  Armington composite  generate speci- 
fications for domestic demand and import demand functions. 
Beef produced for the domestic market can be of different quality than beef produced 
for the export market. An aggregate composite consisting of domestic use and exports 
is utilized to differentiate the goods for domestic and foreign markets. A constant 
elasticity of transformation (CET)  function is  employed to model this transformation 
between domestic demand and exports. The elasticity of transformation used in the 
model is 2.0. The first-order conditions from the CET transformation generate the 
specification for domestic supply and export supply functions. 
The model's price block includes specifications for import price, export price, aggre- 
gate or composite demand price, aggregate supply or composite supply price,  and 
activity price. The U.S. prices for import goods are a function of  world price times 
exchange rates and any import tariffs. The U.S. prices for export goods are a function 
of world price times exchange rates and tariffs in the foreign countries. The aggregate 
demand price for the composite beef, generally known as  Armington composite demand 
price or composite household price, is obtained as a weighted average of import price 
and domestic demand price. The aggregate supply price, known as composite supply 
price or composite firm price, is obtained as a weighted average of  domestic demand 
price and export price. The activity price is derived from the commodity price using the 
same weights employed in the activity-commodity  conversion equations. Thus, we have 
import price, export price, domestic demand price, composite supply price, and com- 
posite demand price. 
The institutional block comprises equations for factor income, gross household income, 
net household income, household consumption demand, investment demand, govern- 
ment revenue, government expenditure, and indirect taxes. Factor income is given as 
factor use times factor prices. Gross household income is the sum of  factor income, 
borrowing, and transfers from government, households, and the rest of the world. Net 
household income is gross income minus household transfers, savings, income tax, and 
transfer to the rest of  the world. A Stone-Geary utility function, which generates a 
linear expenditure demand system for households, is employed to model consumer 
behavior. Unitary income elasticity is assumed in the demand function. Investment 
demand is equal to the investment adjustment factor times the initial level of invest- 
ment. Government revenue is the sum of income taxes from households, investment 
income, and indirect tax receipts. Government expenditures include transfer to house- 
holds, payments to foreigners, government spending, and subsidies. Indirect tax  receipts 
are collected from production activities. 
The final block, system constraints, encompasses the specifications for factor market 
equilibrium, commodity market equilibrium, balance of payments, savings-investment 
balance, and price normalization. The factor market equilibrium requires that the sum of 
the  factors used in each sector equals  the  total endowment. In  the commodity market equi- 
librium, the quantity supplied of  a commodity equals the quantity demanded for inter- 
mediate input use, household consumption, government consumption, and investment. 
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The balance-of-payments equation states that the sum of  export earnings, household 
transfers from foreigners, government transfers from foreigners, and capital inflow is 
equal  to import spending, factor income transfer to foreigners, and institutional transfer 
to foreigners. The balance-of-payments closure keeps foreign savings fixed and allows 
exchange rates to vary. Savings include household, government, and foreign savings. 
Investment includes commodity, institutional, and foreign sectors' investments. In the 
saving-investment closure, marginal propensity to consume is fured and investment is 
endogenous, i.e., investment is savings driven. In the price normalization equation, the 
consumer price index is equal to commodity prices weighted by  the composition of 
commodity baskets. The price normalization sets the numeraire equal to the CPI. 
The CGE model ensures that commodity and factor markets balance, and macro- 
economic identities hold. Equilibrium prices (commodity prices, factor prices, and the 
exchange rate) are endogenously determined to clear the product, factor, and foreign 
exchange markets. Because of the interlinkages of the sectors, shocks in any sector will 
seep through the economy and impact the other sectors. 
Data 
A social accounting matrix (SAM) for the United States was constructed for empirical 
analysis. The data in the SAM capture a detailed, consistent, snapshot representation 
of interactions among economic activities. Thus, the  SAM includes the complete circular 
flow of all the transactions in the production, factor, household, government, and ROW 
sectors. Hence, the SAM is a data counterpart to the CGE model, capturing the numer- 
ical form of  the budget, resource, physical, and financial constraints of  the economy. 
Each element in the SAM, denoted as sij,  represents receipts for account i and expendi- 
tures for column j. The data in the SAM are used to calibrate the parameters of  the 
behavioral equations in the model. 
The data source of the SAM for our economic model was IMPLAN 2000 (Minnesota 
IMPLAN Group, Inc., 2002), which divides the  U.S. economy into 528 sectors. Since the 
model is used for analysis of  the impacts of  the BSE outbreak, more emphasis was 
placed on agricultural sectors. Consequently, the  data  for IMPLAN sectors representing 
food and agriculture industries and commodities were kept at the most disaggregated 
level possible, and the data for those industries and commodities in other categories 
were aggregated. Thus, the 528 sectors of the U.S. economy were aggregated into 231 
distinct sectors: 111 commodity sectors, 100 industrial sectors, two primary factors of 
production (labor and capital), one indirect business tax sector, nine household sectors, 
six government sectors, one savings and investment sector, and one trading sector (rest 
of the world). All prices and exchange rates were normalized to one. 
The GAMS software with PATH Solver was used to construct and solve the system 
of simultaneous nonlinear equations in the CGE model. The parameters of the model 
were calibrated from the base year SAM and the model was solved to replicate the base 
year data. 
Analysis 
In this section, we describe the procedures and assumptions used for the analysis. The 
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ban by more than 50 countries around the world led to a decline of approximately 90% 
in U.S. beef exports. Consistent with these reports, we assumed that for all scenarios, 
the ROW beef and live-cattle demand decreased by 90%. 
Since about 90% of U.S. beef is domestically consumed, loss of consumer confidence 
can result in steep price declines. For example, news media reported that cattle and beef 
prices fell significantly in the days following the aftermath of the  first case of a mad cow 
disease finding. Because the effect of  a single case of  mad cow  disease on domestic 
demand is not known, we considered three different cases of domestic demand declines 
(0%, lo%,  and 25%)  to reflect various states of consumer confidence. Each of these cases 
is analyzed in combination with a 90% decline in U.S. beef exports. Thus, the three 
scenarios are as  follows: 
SCENARIO  1.90%  decline in foreign demand and 0% decline in U.S. domestic demand. 
SCENARIO  2.90% decline in foreign demand and 10%  decline in U.S. domestic demand. 
SCENARIO  3.90%  decline in foreign demand and 25% decline in U.S. domestic demand. 
Scenario 1  is the  most optimistic scenario since the  domestic demand does not decline. 
In contrast, scenario 3 is the  most pessimistic scenario because domestic demand declines 
by 25%. Scenario 2 is the most realistic scenario-i.e.,  domestic demand declines are 
modest and generate results that are reasonable and in line with economic changes in 
the  cattle and beef markets. Scenario 3, though pessimistic, produces results consistent 
with price declines in the first few weeks of the mad cow disease outbreak. Scenario 1 
isolates the effect of the  import ban by foreign countries on U.S. beef and cattle markets. 
The last two scenarios examine the total effect of foreign demand and various levels of 
domestic demand declines on the U.S. beef and cattle markets. 
Results 
This analysis focused on determining the direct and indirect effects on various sectors 
resulting  from changes in  foreign and domestic demand for livestock commodities. Table 
1  presents the results of this analysis for the three scenarios. In the interest of brevity, 
we report the  results of quantity and price changes for important variables in the cattle 
and wholesale beef markets. Changes in foreign demand directly affect both cattle and 
wholesale beef sectors,  while changes in domestic demand directly affect only the  whole- 
sale beef market since U.S. consumers do not directly purchase beef from the cattle 
market. 
While some of the variables in table 1  are self-explanatory, others need additional 
explanation. Domestic demand is that part of total production kept within the United 
States. Domestic demand and exports are combined to form the composite of total U.S. 
production. Imports and domestic demand, which are utilized by various institutions 
(firms, households, government) within the U.S. economy, are combined to form the 
Armington composite.  For prices, we have reported domestic export price, demand price, 
import price, aggregate supply price, and a composite price of  domestic demand and 
import prices. 
First, we describe how the effects of mad cow disease percolate through the economy. 
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Table 1. Impacts of Mad Cow Disease on Cattle and Beef Industry, in Percentage 
Change (foreign demand declines by 90%) 
Quantity Impacts (%I  Price Impacts (%) 
Domestic Demand Shifts by:  Domestic Demand Shifts by: 
Variables  0%  10%  25%  0%  10%  25% 
Exports: 
Ranch and Range Cattle  -89.65  -88.94  -87.77  -40.20  -41.49  -43.42 
Feeder Cattle  -89.37  -88.57  -87.40  -40.72  -42.13  -43.97 
Wholesale Beef  -89.91  -89.39  -88.59  -39.68  -40.68  -42.09 
Domestic Demand: 
Ranch and Range Cattle  -6.69  -11.17  -18.71  -7.17  -11.24  -17.37 
Feeder Cattle  -6.62  -11.09  -18.67  -8.44  -12.78  -18.65 
Wholesale Beef  3.17  -0.99  -8.03  -3.96  -7.27  -12.10 
Domestic Production: 
Ranch and Range Cattle  -7.16  -11.61  -19.11  -7.27  -11.33  -17.45 
Feeder Cattle  -7.10  -11.54  -19.07  -8.54  -12.86  -18.73 
Wholesale Beef  -6.41  -10.10  -16.38  -5.81  -9.05  -13.76 
Imports: 
Ranch and Range Cattle  -16.81  -25.96  -39.16  0.21  0.22  0.23 
Feeder Cattle  -18.46  -27.81  -40.53  0.21  0.22  0.23 
Wholesale Beef  1.00  -4.76  -13.87  0.21  0.22  0.23 
Composite Demand: 
Ranch and Range Cattle  -7.01  -11.63  -19.38  -6.97  -10.93  -16.92 
Feeder Cattle  -6.99  -11.63  -19.40  -8.20  -12.42  -18.16 
Wholesale Beef  2.99  - 1.30  -8.52  -3.63  -6.69  -11.15 
resulting from the consumer fear of mad cow disease. As a result of the demand declines, 
domestic demand price and export price fall. Also, in response to a leftward shift in 
domestic and foreign demand, domestic supply price declines and imports fall. Since the 
domestic demand price decreases and import price is constant (except for the exchange 
rate changes), the composite demand price also falls. 
Several important observations can be made from the results in table 1. First, since 
we exogenously reduced the foreign demand by 90%,  the equilibrium quantity of cattle 
and meat exports falls by nearly 90% in all three scenarios. Second, as would be 
expected, quantity and price impacts are larger for the scenario with 25% reduction in 
domestic demand. Third, because of  the drop in foreign and domestic demand, all 
equilibrium quantities and prices decline in all three scenarios, except for wholesale beef 
consumption in the 0% domestic demand shift scenario. In this scenario, reduction in 
foreign demand is not large enough to offset the lower price effect. 
Consider scenario 1  (90%  reduction in foreign demand and 0% reduction in domestic 
demand). As  the U.S. exports fall, export prices decline by about 40%, but domestic 
demand and domestic supply prices drop only by 7% to 9% for live cattle, and the price 
decrease is even smaller in the beef market.3 Domestic demand and supply prices 
Using a partial equilibrium analysis, Coffey et al. (2005) found equilibrium beef price declined by about 8%-10%  due to 
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decrease only by about 4% and 6%, respectively, in the beef market. This is because the 
United States exports only 10%  of its beef, and consequently a large decline in foreign 
demand does not lead to a steep decline in domestic prices. As beef exports fall, more 
beef products are available for the domestic market, causing a decline in domestic 
prices. This results in a small increase in domestic consumption of beef as this scenario 
assumes domestic consumers do not change their consumption behavior in response to 
a BSE outbreak. This finding corroborates the rise in U.S. beef consumption by  1.8% 
from 2003 to 2004, as reported by Coffey et al. (2005). As the foreign demand for U.S. 
beef declines, the domestic demand for cattle and slaughtering drops. In response to a 
fall in domestic prices, cattle and meat supply decreases by about 7%.  As a consequence 
of the mad cow disease setback, cattlemen are reluctant to import cattle, and slaughter 
houses also reduce cattle imports. Because of the domestic beef demand increase in this 
scenario, beef imports also increase. Finally, since the composite demand is a mixture 
of domestic and imported goods, the  composite demand for live cattle also decreases, but 
the composite beef demand increases. 
Scenario 2 examines the effects of  a modest reduction in domestic demand (10%) 
along with a 90% decline in foreign demand. This scenario generates results that are 
slightly larger than those under scenario 1. However, unlike in scenario 1, the equilib- 
rium quantity of  domestic demand for beef declines because of  the downward demand 
shift in this scenario. Domestic demand for cattle falls by approximately 11%  and beef 
demand by  only about 1%. In response to foreign and domestic demand reductions, 
supply price also declines, ranging from 11% to 13% in cattle markets, and 9% in the 
beef market. This causes cattle and beef supply to fall. Because of  the large shift in 
domestic demand, imports also fall. The composite cattle and beef demand decreases by 
about 12% and 1.3%,  respectively. Composite demand prices fall in the cattle markets 
(11%-12%) and in the  beef market (7%).  The results of this scenario are  probably a more 
realistic depiction of  the mad cow  disease outbreak in that the price and quantity 
changes are consistent with economic reasoning. 
Scenario 3 is the worst-case or the most pessimistic scenario with a 25% domestic 
demand reduction in addition to a 90% foreign demand decline. Under this scenario, 
domestic demand and supply prices of cattle decline by 17%  to 19%,  and beef prices go 
down by  12% to 14%. These price drops are in line with the temporary price fall (as 
noted in the introduction) observed in the days following the aftermath of the mad cow 
disease discovery, and also corroborate the  findings of Henderson (2003).  However, this 
price fall was not sustained, as the  beef and cattle industry recovered after a few weeks. 
In this scenario, domestic demand for cattle falls by  about 19%. In response to the 
downward shift in domestic demand, cattle and beef imports also decrease. Composite 
demand declines in cattle and beef markets are considerably higher than those under 
scenario 2. Verbeke and  Ward (2001);  Herrmann,  Thompson,  and Krischik-Bautz (2002); 
and Latouche, Rainelli, and Vermersch (1998)  have found that health safety scares due 
to BSE and other beef-related crises do reduce the demand for meat. Burton and Young 
(1996) and Verbeke and Ward (2001)  also concluded that negative publicity from TV  and 
press coverage of a BSE crisis reduces demand for beef significantly. 
Table 2 reports the effects of  a BSE outbreak on revenues, labor income, capital 
income, feed prices, and substitute meat products. As expected, returns to labor and 
capital are significantly reduced in all scenarios, but more so in the last two scenarios. 
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Table 2.  Effects of Mad Cow Disease on Key Aggregate 
Variables (%) 
Domestic Demand Shifts by: 
Aggregate Variables  0%  10%  25% 
Revenues: 
Ranch and Range Cattle  -13.87  -21.57  -  33.15 
Feeder Cattle  -  14.97  -22.84  -34.13 
Wholesale Beef  -12.18  -  19.56  -30.68 
Returns to Labor: 
Ranch and Range Cattle  -  24.35  -37.06  -54.82 
Feeder Cattle  -34.63  -50.70  -70.41 
Wholesale Beef  -8.37  -  14.14  -23.61 
Returns to Capital: 
Ranch and Range Cattle  -24.56  -37.35  -55.18 
Feeder Cattle  -34.91  -51.05  -70.77 
Wholesale Beef  -8.45  - 14.27  -23.81 
Feed Price:  -3.94  -6.20  -9.73 
Substitute Meat Demand: 
Pork  0.08  7.12  17.66 
Poultry  0.10  5.53  13.13 
Fish  0.04  3.44  8.52 
beef industry, i.e., cattle producers bear the brunt of the adverse impacts. The revenue 
loss to cattle producers ranges from 14%  to 34% from scenario 1  to scenario 3. Based on 
these results, the cattle and beef  industries will be adversely impacted if  the BSE 
outbreak is extensive. 
The effects of  price, quantity, and revenue declines are reflected in the labor and 
capital income losses. Since labor is a derived demand, declines in cattle and beef pro- 
duction lead to lower labor demand, which results in labor income loss. Because capital 
is sector specific, i.e., fured, its use does not decline, but rental rate falls (due to output 
price and quantity declines) and capital income also falls. The declines in labor and 
capital incomes in the cattle industry range from 24% to 71%  across the three scenarios. 
These declines are smaller in the beef industry. Since feed demand is also a derived 
demand, feed prices decrease by 4% to 10%  from scenario 1  to scenario 3. 
The impacts on other meat demands show an increase in scenarios 2 and 3, but prac- 
tically no change in scenario 1. The negligible change in the consumption of pork, poultry, 
and fish under scenario 1  is due to the assumption that domestic demand does not shift 
leftward. However, in the other two scenarios,  domestic demand does shift leftward, which 
results in consumers reallocating their budget in favor of  substitute meats. Increase in 
demand is larger for pork, followed by poultry and fish. Substitute meat demand under 
scenario 3 increases by more than double the increase shown for scenario 2. 
The impacts of the BSE scare in other sectors of the economy, even in our worst- 
case scenario, are  negligible because cattle and beef industries are a small part of the 
overall U.S. economy. Consequently, changes in gross domestic product are  very small. 
McDonald and Roberts (1998)  found that the BSE crisis in England had larger impacts Devadoss et al.  Mad Cow Disease  45 1 
in the related meat sectors because of the extensive occurrence of the disease and 143 
cases of human death. Even with these catastrophes in the beef and cattle industries, 
the authors concluded that the macroeconomic effects were minor because the  beef and 
cattle industries are small relative to the overall U.K. economy. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Many of the parameters in the model are calibrated from the social accounting matrix 
of the U.S. economy, but some of the parameters (e.g., Armington elasticity of substitu- 
tion and export demand elasticities) are  free and are assignedvalues consistent with the 
equilibrium. We reviewed the literature extensively to select the values for these free 
parameters. Reinert and Ronald-Holst (1992) estimated the Armington elasticity of 
substitution, ranging from a low of 0.14 to a high of 3.49, for 163 U.S. manufacturing 
sectors. In general, their results suggest that the substitutions between U.S. domestic 
and imported goods are relatively limited. Shiells and Reinert (1993) selected 22 
manufacturing sectors from the earlier study of Reinert and Ronald-Holst (1992) and 
estimated the elasticity of substitution for U.S. goods and imports from Canada, Mexico, 
and the rest of the world, which ranged from 0.04 to 2.97. 
Feenstra (1994) incorporated new product varieties into the CES function and 
obtained an  elasticity of substitution ranging from 1.3  to 3.0 for six manufactured goods. 
Kapuscinski and Warr (1999)  estimated the  elasticity of substitution  for the  Philippines, 
and their results varied from 0.2 to 4.0, with most of the estimates being greater than 
one. Bilgic et  al. (2002)  considered U.S. regional economies and obtained elasticity esti- 
mates of 1.5  for farm products, 1.8 for nonmetallic minerals, and 1.1  for all commodities. 
Purcell(1998)  estimated Japanese demand elasticity for U.S. beef at -  1.8; and Coffey 
et  al. (2005),  in  their analysis of mad cow disease, assumed export demand elasticity for 
U.S. beef at -  1.0 and -2.0. 
Based on these literature reviews, we considered benchmark Armington elasticities 
of substitution of 2.0 for manufacturing, 1.5  for cattle sectors, and 0.5 for wholesale beef, 
and an export demand elasticity of -3.0 for beef and cattle sectors and -5.0 for all other 
commodities. We then conducted sensitivity analyses for more inelastic and elastic 
values to provide information on the reliability of the results generated from the model. 
For inelastic values, we chose the  Armington elasticity of substitution at  0.99 for manu- 
facturing and cattle sectors, and 0.3 for wholesale beef. For elastic values, the corres- 
ponding elasticities of  substitution are 3.0 and 2.0. For sensitivity analysis of  export 
demand elasticities, we considered -  1.0 and -5.0 for cattle and beef sectors. 
The changes in the key endogenous variables in response to different elasticity param- 
eters are only modest, ranging from about 1% to 3%. The only exception is that the 
changes in imports and domestic demand are larger, as one would expect, as elasticity 
of substitution becomes larger. These sensitivity results highlight the stability of the 
model and the reliability of our findings. 
Summary 
This study has analyzed the impacts of mad cow disease occurrences in the United 
States on the cattle and beef industry using a large-scale general equilibrium model. 
Three scenarios, ranging from most favorable to most pessimistic, were considered for 452  August 2006  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
the analysis. The most realistic scenario is probably scenario 2, with a 90% decline in 
foreign demand and 10% reduction in U.S. domestic demand. This scenario generates 
results consistent with the  outcomes after  the  mad cow disease outbreak in 2003, though 
scenario 3 produces price results that closely parallel the cattle futures and beef cash 
price declines (19%)  in the days following the discovery of mad cow disease. However, 
such a large fall in prices was attributed to the psychological and emotional reactions 
of traders and consumers to the first case of mad cow disease in the United States, and 
probably did not indicate an  equilibrium outcome. The cattle and beef markets were able 
to recover from this initial price decline within two months. 
The impact of mad cow disease even in our worst-case scenario is not as  damaging as 
the mad cow disease outbreak experienced in Canada, because Canada depends on the 
foreign market, particularly the United States, for selling about 60% of  its cattle and 
beef. When the United States closed its border, the Canadian cattle and beef industry 
was economically de~imated.~  Since the United States exports only 10% of  its beef, 
reduction in foreign imports of U.S. beef did not have large effects. Only if the domestic 
demand declines significantly will the economic hardship in the U.S. beef and cattle 
industry be very large. However, the U.S. government and the cattle industry imple- 
mented several important measures to prevent a precipitous fall in domestic demand. 
These measures included establishing a coordinated campaign to assure the  public that 
U.S. beef is safe to consume, instituting proactive steps to ban potentially infected meat 
entering the food chain, developing a national tracking system of cattle, expanding the 
number of downer cattle tested for mad cow disease, strengthening the existing ruminant 
feed ban, enforcing tighter restrictions on slaughterhouse techniques, and implementing 
a faster testing procedure for mad cow disease. 
The economic damage was also lessened by the  finding that the infected Holstein cow 
was born in Canada before 1997, the year the United States and Canada banned the 
practice of feeding cattle with feed containing animal brain and spinal cord tissue. This 
finding implies that  U.S. cattle, particularly those born after 1997, are likely to be free 
from mad cow disease. 
The economic loss could have been much worse if the mad cow disease outbreak was 
more extensive. Our  findings suggest that a large-scale outbreak could have devastating 
consequences on the cattle and beef industry. In light of such findings, our results could 
be used by policy makers to take necessary measures to prevent a future outbreak of 
mad cow disease. 
[Received November 2004;$nal  revision received March 2006.1 
The U.S. import restrictions prohibited more than one million Canadian cattle from entering the United States. These 
import restrictions created an enormous excess supply and hurt the Canadian cattle industry. Cattle prices in Canada 
declined by  about $20/cwt (Clemens, 2005). The U.S. policy and the ensuing cattle oversupply led Canadian producers to 
invest in building additional slaughter and processing plants. The U.S. policy also caused U.S. beef packers to lose about $1.8 
billion in beef and by-product sales revenues (Schroeder and Leatherman, 2004). Devadoss et al. 
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